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Many welfare reforms undertaken in OECD-countries are directed towards 
enhancing efficiency in the administration and implementation of social security. In 
this perspective, reforms in The Netherlands are an example of decentralization 
through budgeting financial means to municipalities. By using data envelopment 
analysis, we assess the effect of the introduction of the new Work and Social 
Assistance Act (WSA) in 2004 on cost efficiency. By applying a stochastic frontier 
analysis, we assess the impact of municipal policy strategies on cost inefficiency 
for the period 2005-2007. We find a clear positive effect of the WSA in 2004 on 
cost efficiency. Pursuing a strategy of activation raised efficiency significantly. 
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Decentralization of national welfare policies to local government levels is one of 
the main movements shaping social welfare in the US and in Europe (Habibov and 
Fan, 2010; Eichhorst et al., 2008; Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007a, 2007b; Van 
Berkel, 2006; OECD, 2003, 1999). According to Eichhorst et al. (2008), who refer 
to this shift as ‘tools of New Welfare Governance’, it comprises processes of 
territorial or functional decentralization, which are quite similar across countries. 
In their view promoting the success of social policies, their provision and delivery 
has to be considered jointly with the organization and management of this 
process.  
 
Decentralization is often justified by a need to improve efficiency. It prevents 
agency problems between national and local governments and local governments 
are assumed to be better able to adapt policy measures to local needs, priorities 
and local partnerships (Balaquer-Coll et al., 2010; OECD, 2003, 1999; Nativel et 
al., 2002). Kelleher and Yackee (2004) add the presumption that local officials can 
address problems more effectively. This paper evaluates two central claims in the 
decentralization debate. One claim is the overall positive impact of decentralization 
on the cost efficiency of local governments in public service delivery. The second 
claim is that local governments can indeed address and influence local problems 
more effectively.  
 
The literature shows mixed results on the effects of decentralization as will be 
discussed in section 2. To evaluate the two central claims in de decentralization 
debate, we use a unique dataset covering the period 2000-2007 during which 
major reforms in the administration of welfare and social benefits in The 
Netherlands took place. The introduction of the new Work and Social Assistance 
Act (WSA) in 2004 decentralizes full (financial) responsibility for activating and 
reintegrating the 340,000 social assistance clients they had in 2004. An important 
aspect of the WSA-reforms is the change in funding of municipalities. Instead of 
claiming all social assistance expenses directly from the central government, from 
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2004 onwards, local governments get a fixed budget to cover all social assistance 
expenses. This new governance model creates incentives for reducing the number 
of benefit receivers since money saved by municipalities, originally earmarked for 
benefits, can be used for financing other expenses for local public goods. Since 
2004 municipalities also have more freedom in choosing measures for activating 
their beneficiaries (Van Geuns and Van Gent, 2007; Tergeist and Grubb, 2006; 
Van Berkel, 2006). 
 
But there is another relevant aspect in this matter. The main conclusion in a 
substantial and growing body of evaluation literature on active labour market 
policy is that there are indeed positive effects of local labour market policy 
instruments, but also that the net effects are in fact quite small (Card, Kluve and 
Weber, 2010; Kluve et al., 2007; De Koning et al., 2007; Grogger et al., 2002). 
Therefore, a second interesting question is if municipalities in a decentralized 
system are better able to prevent social assistance dependency and to promote 
outflow to the labour market. 
 
The reform of the Dutch welfare system and the data set at hand gives a unique 
possibility to gain insight in these two fundamental questions about the effects of 
decentralization. The first question will be addressed for the period 2001-2007, so 
that an adequate assessment can be given of the WSA-reform in 2004, using Data 
Envelopment Analysis. The second question will be addressed for the shorter 
period 2005-2007, because only for this period more detailed information on 
municipal policy initiatives is available. We use Stochastic Frontier Analysis to 
assess the impact of the policy initiatives on efficiency.  
In section two we describe the arguments in favor and against the expectations 
that decentralization lead to more efficiency. In section three we go into the 
specifics of Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as 
appropriate methods to analyze the efficiency of decentralization. Section four 
discusses the data used and the research design applied in this paper. In section 
five and six the empirical results are presented and finally section seven concludes 




2. (IN)EFFICIENCY OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
There are two main arguments why decentralization should lead to more 
efficiency. The first reason has its origin in a rational institutionalist way of 
thinking, which is the basis for the new public management or neo-institutional 
economics (Ter Bogt, 2008; Scott, 2001; Hall & Taylor, 1996). Organizations are 
assumed to make rational choices between costs and revenues, are well-informed 
and in pursuit of efficiency. Because of information-asymmetry the national 
government cannot adequately control municipalities so local governments can 
relatively easily shift the costs of public service delivery to national governments. 
This dilemma could be overcome by reinforcing the financial incentives of 
municipalities for better implementation. In its turn, this should lead to more 
efficiency both at the local and at the national level. Furthermore, this could also 
stimulate policy innovation and policy learning, because it allows for several 
simultaneous experiments by local governments (Strumpf, 2002). The second 
reason has its origin in the contingency theory of organizations, which assumes 
that in becoming efficient, organizations should adapt to different environments 
(Donaldson, 2001). It is argued that local governments should be better equipped 
to adapt policy programs to local needs and circumstances, which should make 
social policies more flexible and more effective (Kelleher and Yackee, 2004; OECD, 
2003; 1998). In situations where local policy responsibility is accompanied by 
financial responsibility, there is a clear incentive to perform better. Eventually this 
would enhance the efficiency. While both theoretical approaches lead to more 
efficiency, the underlying mechanisms are different. 
  
Theoretically, it is also possible to think of a scenario in which efficiency 
improvements do not take place. In the neo-institutional organizational sociology, 
organizations do not pursue efficiency per se, simply because organizations do not 
always know what is effective, i.e. what is working and what is not. This certainly 
is true for ‘weak technology’ organizations such as schools and social welfare 
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organizations. In absence of knowledge and information, such organizations accept 
practices that have legitimacy instead of an empirically proven efficiency. That 
does not mean that organizations act irrationally or do not formulate goals and 
specify ways to reach them but ‘…. these beliefs are myths in the sense that they 
depend for their efficacy, for their reality, on the fact that they are widely shared, 
or are promulgated by individuals or groups that have been granted the right to 
determine such matters’ (Scott & Meyer [1983], 1993: 1). In this social-
constructionist point of view organizations behave according to normative and 
cultural guidelines. The outcome of this behavior could be that organizations 
converge ’... around short-term behavioral equilibria that may be less efficient 
than rejected alternatives (DiMaggio, 1998: 697). Legitimacy instead of efficiency 
also plays a role in the political institutional point of view which introduces the 
concept of political conflict and path dependency. Here is organizational behavior 
the result of political conflict which often leads to compromises at the end. This 
could lead organizations to accept goals that differ from the national of efficiency 
one (see for instance: Bredgaard et al. 2003). Furthermore, the fact that 
municipalities are democratically controlled organizations, with different political 
assemblies and priorities could lead to outcomes that are less efficient.  
 
The empirical literature shows mixed results on the effects of decentralization. For 
instance, Rodriquez-Pose and Bwire (2004) found no effect when they relate 
changes in levels of regional autonomy to regional differences in economic growth 
patterns in regions in six European countries. Otsuka et al (2010) found that the 
fiscal transfer of funds for regional public spending from the Japanese central 
government to local governments negatively affected their performance because 
the governmental funding reduced their motivation towards an efficient use of the 
taxpayer’s money in supplying public goods. Balaguer-Coll et al. (2010) found for 
Spain that for the municipal level there is not a clear-cut answer as to whether 
enhanced decentralization, or enhanced centralization, is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in terms 
of cost efficiency. Their results suggest that some municipalities could manage 
their resources more efficiently if they were granted more power. Although these 
sort of decentralized economies do not emerge for all municipalities, their 
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magnitude clearly overshadows the diseconomies found if downscaling of decision 
making goes too far and least decentralized municipalities dominate. 
 
For the US, the introduction of the US Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunities Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996 which rendered federal states 
more discretionary power, evoked a theoretical and empirical debate on whether 
the decline in social assistance dependency was caused by the unprecedented 
economic growth in the 1990’s or by the effects of welfare reforms and 
decentralization. See Danielson and Klerman (2008), Wallace (2007), Klerman and 
Haider (2004), Blank (2002), Bell (2002). Huffmann et al. (2007) analyzed the 
regional variation of the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) 
program that each state has to develop under PRWORA. They find very little 
evidence that household behavior with respect to TANF instruments varies across 
regions in the U.S. This finding may undermine the efficiency rationale for 
devolution of authority over welfare programs to the states. But they also find that 
similar instruments may lead to different outcomes across regions because 
demographic and initial conditions vary. Thus, to achieve similar outcomes across 
regions, region-specific policies may be warranted. This is also argued by Blien et 
al. (2010) for Germany. For Sweden, Lundin and Skedinger (2006) investigated 
the effects of decentralization of active labour market policies. Although they do 
not focus on separate policy measures, they conclude that decentralization has 
spurred local initiatives in the form of projects organized by municipalities and 
increased targeting on outsiders on the labour market.  
Besides decentralization also coordination between and within governmental 
organizations might improve efficient decision making that is beneficial for 
successful policy outcomes in terms of economic performance of regions. However, 
the empirical literature with regard to the positive effect of coordination is scarce. 
Hammond and Tosun (2011) find for the US that the fragmentation of general-
purpose governments per capita has a negative impact on employment and 
population growth in nonmetropolitan counties. Their results suggest that local 
government decentralization matters differently for metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan counties. A study by Grassmueck and Shields (2010) for the US 
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shows the opposite: regions with fragmented governmental structures perform 
better. They do not suggest that fragmented regional government units are more 
efficient in producing and providing public goods, but argue that households and 
firms may be willing to forego additional efficiency for more localized control over 
public policies.  
 
This paper evaluates two central claims in the decentralization debate. First, what 
have been the effects of decentralization on the municipal cost efficiency of social 
assistance benefits? It adds to the literature of assessing the impact of public 
management reform, especially at the local levels of government and public 
service delivery (Ter Bogt, 2008; Ridder, Bruns and Spier, 2005). Second, what is 
the influence of local policy strategies on this efficiency? It contributes to the 
literature of assessing the impact of instruments of active labour market policy 
(Card et al., 2010; Kluve et al., 2007). 
      
3. FRONTIER ANALYSIS  
 
Performances of firms or institutions are usually analyzed in terms of productive or 
cost efficiency. Efficiency is determined by the proximity of the actual production 
or costs of the firm or institution to the production or cost frontier. The absence of 
efficiency necessarily leads to a departure from production maximization or cost 
minimization and therefore creates inefficiency. In this paper, we focus on 
municipal cost efficiency with respect to their social assistance payments. The size 
of this cost inefficiency is based on the difference between observed costs and 
predicted minimum costs given scale, a mix of relevant outputs and factor prices 
as explanatory variables. In other words, each municipality in the sample is 
benchmarked against the ‘best’ municipality in the sample. 
 
In the literature, frontiers have been estimated in the past using many different 
methods. Coelli (1996a, 1996b, 1999) clearly explains the pros and cons of the 
various methods like Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) that we will use in our empirical analysis. The non-parametric 
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approach to measuring efficiency, DEA, has the advantage of imposing less 
structure on the frontier than the parametric approach SFA. On the other hand, a 
drawback of the non-parametric DEA approach is the deterministic nature, i.e. not 
allowing for random errors caused by chance, data problems or other 
measurement errors.  
 
In this paper, we first apply DEA to explore the changes in efficiency of municipal 
costs of social assistance caused by the introduction of the WSA in the Netherlands 
in 2004 by using data over the period 2001-2007. In the case of municipalities’ 
social assistance expenses, this means that the efficient municipality is not able to 
cut more on social assistance costs, given its demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics.  
 
Next, we would like to assess the impact of municipal policy strategies on the 
efficiency of social assistance costs. Information about the policy strategies is only 
available for the shorter period 2005-2007 and can thus not be analyzed for the 
total period 2001-2007. DEA is a deterministic and non-parametric technique that 
does not allow the inclusion of policy strategies that can be related to 
inefficiencies. Therefore we apply SFA which is basically a parametric regression 
model with random errors. In a SFA these errors comprise (i) inefficiencies, 
following an asymmetric distribution, usually a truncated or half-normal 
distribution, and (ii) random errors following a symmetric distribution, usually a 
standard normal distribution. The reason for this particular structure of the 
composite error term is that inefficiencies are part of the error process and by 
definition cannot be negative. In order to link efficiency to municipal policy 
strategies, we use a single-step estimation procedure, where both SFA and 
strategy effects on efficiency are addressed simultaneously. This implies that 








For the empirical analysis we have used data for all 443 municipalities in the 
Netherlands over the period of 2001-2007.i Most data we use are drawn from 
Statistics Netherlands. The exact sources and definitions of the variables are 
documented in the Appendix. The data on expenditures on social assistance are 
from the Netherlands Ministry of Social Affairs.ii  
 
In the frontier analysis the actual absolute municipal social assistance 
expenditures to pay benefits is the dependent (or output) variable.iii The inputs are 
identified as the variables that are used by the central government to determine 
the budgeted expenditures on social assistance for each municipality based on 
objective variables not at the municipal’s discretioniv. The basic idea is that these 
objective variables determine to a large extent the inevitable burden of social 
assistance. These variables are e.g. the number of single-parent households, the 
share of non-Western minorities and regional job growth. The budgets are in fact 
very close to the actual expenditures and hence expenditures are closely related to 
these ‘objective’ factors that determine the budgets as well.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA is used to 
gain insight in the development of overall efficiency over the whole period 2001-
2007 and allows us to detect if the efficiency improved after the introduction of the 
WSA in 2004. As a next step, we apply Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) as the 
appropriate method to find out if changes in efficiency are related to the use of 
particular policy strategies by municipalities to limit social assistance dependency 
(Broersma et al. 2011; Edzes 2010). Information on the policy strategies is 
available only for the period 2005-2007. We will now elaborate on this issue. Each 
of these strategies can be identified by a number of indicators. Table 1 shows 
which indicators are used to reflect each strategy (Edzes, 2010).  
 
A straightforward indicator for the control strategy is the share of detected fraud 
cases. We assume that the detected fraud case is a valid and reliable indicator for 
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actual efforts from municipalities to combat fraud behavior. An analysis of 
differences between municipalities shows that substantial differences between 
municipalities in detected fraud cases occur when we look at region, scale and 
urbanization suggesting different efforts from municipalities (Edzes, 2010). The 
control strategy might also check whether social assistance benefit recipients are 
eligible for other social security arrangements that are not paid from the budget of 
the municipality. A successful strategy will raise the influx in such measures as 
disability for those without work experience (Wajong) or as social work provision 
(WSW) and therefore the influx in these type of social benefits will be above 
average in that municipality.  
 
An activation strategy comprises subsidized employment, where social assistance 
benefit recipients obtain a sheltered job for which the wage costs are covered by a 
subsidyv instead of from the income part of social-assistance budget. Activation 
may also take the form of providing courses that enhance the skills for a job or job 
search, such as application courses. Municipalities are free in the design as well as 
the number of courses they provide. Although the budget municipalities receive for 
activation strategies is fixed and determined by the number of recipients of social 
assistance corrected by the local labour market situation, municipalities differ 
substantially in the number and type of courses provided as well as the share of 
the activation budget they spend on courses (Edzes, 2010).  
 
The employment strategy is reflected by the growth rate of the number of 
establishments, indicating successful municipal efforts to create favorable business 
conditions, and by the municipal expenses on economic affairs. Finally, the 
coordination strategy is reflected by the extent to which municipal social services, 
who carry out social assistance, work together in so called Inter Municipality 
Services (IMS).    
 
 




As a next step we determine for each municipality whether it lies above or below 
the national average of each of the indicators.vi If a municipality has a score above 
the national average on one indicator, reflecting a particular strategy, a dummy 
for such a municipality will be labeled 1, indicating it as user of this strategy. 
Based on the number of strategies a municipality uses, it will be allocated to one 
of the 16 single or multiple policy strategy categories in Table 2. Note that the 16 
categories are mutually exclusive, i.e. each municipality enters in one and only 
one strategy option. 
  
 
-- Table 2 somewhere here -- 
 
 
Table 2 shows the distribution over the 16 policy categories. The number of 
strategies by municipalities, for the period 2005-2008, adds up to a total of 1329, 
i.e. for each of the three years, all 443 municipalities are covered. Note that most 
municipalities have no focus on any of the strategies, i.e. their value on each 
indicator for the policy strategies is below average and this leads to the 
classification that 711 municipalities between 2005-2008 are in the strategy 
category ‘None’. Note also that only a few municipalities focus on three strategies 
simultaneously, while there is no municipality focusing on all four options. Since 
particularly the option of using three strategies is not very popular among 
municipalities, we have also estimated the model with a variable indicating the 




5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section the empirical results are presented with regard to the efficiency 
measures obtained by applying the DEA and SFA approach. First we applied DEA 
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using the computer program of Coelli (1996a). DEA is a deterministic and non-
parametric analytical approach in which linear programming determines the 
efficiency. The output variable comprises the municipal social assistance 
expenditures, which will be related to eight inputs, viz. the demographic and 
socio-economic variables that determine the municipal social assistance budget: 
(i) household with a low income, (ii) single parent households, (iii) non-Western 
minorities, (iv) inhabitants with an unemployment insurance benefit, (v) 
inhabitants with a low education, (vi) vacancy-unemployment ratio of the COROP-
region (NUTS-3 region) in which the municipality is located, (vii) number of 
municipal jobs and (viii) address density, as urbanization measure. 
 
Figure 1 gives the average annual efficiency of municipal social assistance 
expenses between 2001 and 2007, based on the above DEA modelvii. First of all 
we can conclude that the overall level of efficiency is high (above 90 percent) in all 
years. Clearly the pattern of the efficiency over time shows a break in 2004. We 
conducted a sensitivity analysis by varying the inputs. Apart from minor changes 
in the average efficiency level, the pattern over time, including the clear break in 
2004, remained the same. This provides evidence in favor of the premise that 
introduction of the decentralization of the WSA to municipalities has raised 
efficiency. Efficiency rose from 91 percent in the period 2001-2003 to 95 percent 
in the period 2004-2007, a 4 percent points increase between 2003 and 2004. 
Note the downward trend in efficiency after 2005. The explanation for his negative 
trend will be discussed in the sequel. 
 
 
-- Figure 1 somewhere here -- 
 
 
The next step is that we relate the variation in efficiency among municipalities to 
the policy strategies they use in an SFA-model. Because data for the policy 
strategies are not available for all years, this analysis is only possible for the 
period 2005-2007 The cost frontier model comprises a cost model, relating 
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municipal social assistance costs (SAC) to a number of  explanatory variables and 
an inefficiency model relating inefficiency (u) to municipal strategy variables (D-
policy-strat). The SFA model is specified as  
 
         tiortipargletiinclowtti POPHHHHSAC ,,min3.,sin2,,1,0, loglogloglog   
        titiedulowtiinsurunem UVPOPPOP ,6,,5,,4 logloglog    (1) 
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where SACi,t are the social assistance expenses of municipality i in period t. The βo 
represents period fixed effects, the other β’s are parameters.viii HH-variables 
represent the number of households with specific characteristics (low income or 
single parent), POP refers to the number of inhabitants with certain characteristics 
(non-Western minority, having an unemployment insurance benefit or low 
education). V/U is the vacancy-unemployment ratio of the COROP region (NUTS3-
level) in which the municipality is located and acts as an approximation of 
municipal labour market tightness, A/S is the number of addresses (A) per km2 
municipal surface (S), which acts as measure of urbanization. Jobs represents the 
number of jobs located within a municipality and finally the D-variables refer to 
dummy variables reflecting municipal characteristics, viz. the part of the country 
NUTS1-region where the municipality is located and the size class it belongs to.ix 
Finally, the error terms in (1) comprises vi,t+ui,t. The vi,t’s are iid random variables 
following a N(0,σv
2) distribution and the ui,t>0 are iid distributed N(μi,t,σu
2). The 
ui,t’s represent the inefficiency parameter, related to the municipal policy 




The estimation results of the SFA model are reported in Table 3. The first model 
includes all possible options and combinations of policy strategies and also 
includes period fixed effects.xi The results for model (1) in the first column of table 
3 show that period fixed effects are not significantly different from zero, so they 
can validly be omitted from the model of column one, which gives the results 
represented in the second column. In the models of columns 3 and 4, we 
experiment with grouping municipalities that combine two or three policy 
strategies, because some combinations of specific policy strategies are only used 
by a very limited number of municipalities.  
 
For these four model specifications, we find that all explanatory variables in the 
cost model part of (1) are highly significant and have the expected sign. The 
variables in the cost model explain a lot of the variation in social assistance costs. 
A simple OLS regression of these variables without the policy variables shows an 
R2 of 0.96.  
 
Next we turn to the results of the inefficiency part of the model in the lower panel 
of Table 3. Please note that a negative coefficient implies that the particular policy 
measure improved the efficiency, whereas a positive coefficient points towards 
lower efficiency. The results for the model of the second column of table 3 show 
that most policy variables are not significant and that some of the variables that 
are significant show an unexpected sign. An improvement in efficiency is exerted 
by a policy strategy of activating social assistance recipients. The control strategy 
and some combinations of control and job creation have a worsening effect on 
efficiency, and this also occurs for a focus on the combination of the three 
strategies of control, activation and coordination. When we group all municipalities 
that employ two or three strategies in the model of the third column, the 
combination of two strategies still lowers efficiency. The estimation results in the 
fourth column show that when all municipalities that employ more than one 
strategy are taken together in one variable, the result still is that a focus on 




-- Table 3 somewhere here -- 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the average municipal efficiency score for the years 2005-2007, 
based on the SFA estimations in the final column of table 5. The efficiency pattern 
we found with the SFA-model is very similar to the efficiency pattern we found 
with DEA-approach for the same period 2005-2007, i.e. a downward trend after 
2004 and a high overall efficiency of roughly 95 percent. 
 
 





6. DEVELOPMENTS IN COST EFFICIENCY 
 
Based on the finally selected model in the fourth column of Table 3, the result of 
Table 4 provide additional information on the mean level and the variation over 
municipalities of the various policy strategies we have distinguished.  
 
-- Table 4 somewhere here -- 
 
 
It is clear that only strategies of activation (A) and employment (E) show a higher 
average mean efficiency than the baseline strategy, i.e. without focus on a 
particular strategy, while the control and coordination strategy and combinations 
of strategies lead to lower efficiency levels.  
 
A possible explanation for the negative effect of control as strategy might be that 
2005-2007 was a period of strong job growth following the 2002-2003 recession. 
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In these circumstances with a lot of open vacancies, many social assistance 
recipients move relatively easily into employment. Control is now likely not as 
effective as in less favorable periods when recipients put less effort in job search 
with the argument that no jobs are available.  
 
A plausible reason for the strong positive impact of activation as policy strategy is 
the fact that the employment inflow of social assistance recipients in regular jobs 
is more successful in this period of many job openings. In addition to that, 
activation might be successful because it is strongly linked to subsidized 
employment programs. For municipalities it is profitable if the activation strategy 
causes that a person no longer receives a social assistance benefit from the 
income-part of the budget, but instead gets a sheltered job of which the wage is 
paid from the work-part of the budget. So, from the perspective of social 
assistance expenditures, an outflow into regular or subsidized jobs increases 
efficiency. From the perspective of overall active labour market costs at the 
national level, the costs of subsidized employment are a mere substitute of social 
assistance costs. Only when subsidized employment is temporary and helps to get 
a regular jobs after some time, it contributes to the efficiency of social assistance 
expenditures. 
 
Our results do not imply that for any further increase in efficiency, municipalities 
should pursue a strategy of activation. In the period 2005-2007, this might have 
raised cost efficiency, but in other periods other strategies, or combinations 
thereof, might be more useful. The downward trend in efficiency for 2005-2007 in 
Figure 1 and 2 may be due to changes in the economic situation. Immediately 
after the 2002-2003 recession, it is relatively easy to activate the best skilled 
benefit recipients. After a few years, it will be harder to activate those with lesser 
skill levels to employment. This causes the slight downward trend in efficiency for 
the period 2005-2007. 
 
As a final step in the interpretation of the results we will analyse the distribution of 
the efficiency scores over the municipalities in more detail. Figure 3 compares the 
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efficiency scores based on the DEA-approach for 2001, 2004 and 2007. This figure 
shows that the share of municipalities operating on the cost frontier (efficiency 
score = 1) is fairly constant over time around 30 percent. Moreover, these appear 
to be largely the same municipalities over time. The municipal efficiency scores 
obtained with the SFA-approach for 2005-2007 are in Figure 4. This figure shows 
interesting differences in the development of efficiency for the lower and higher 
end of the distribution of efficiency. Comparing 2005 with 2006 and particularly 
2007, shows that efficiency at the lower end of the distribution deteriorated. At the 
same time, comparing the same years at the higher end of the distribution yields 
exactly the opposite. Now, efficiency in both 2006 and 2007 improved compared 
to 2005. However, the overall deterioration of efficiency at the lower end 
outweighed the improvement and the higher end and this leads to the slightly 
lowering efficiency over time that was already shown in Figure 1. It is also clear 
that, overall, efficiency levels are highest around 2004 and 2005, but slightly fall 
thereafter, as confirmed in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
 
-- Figures 3 and 4 somewhere here -- 
 
 
The patterns of the annual efficiency scores of these figures imply that these 
scores change over time and partly depend on municipal policy strategies. What 
has happened between 2005 and 2007 is that many municipalities abandoned the 
option for not pursuing a particular strategy. The number of municipalities with no 
particular strategy dropped from 272 in 2005 to 199 in 2007. The number of 
municipalities with a control strategy rose from 23 in 2005 to 30 in 2007. 
Something similar happened with combinations of strategies, rising between 2005 
and 2007 from 24 to 88 municipalities. This led to the deterioration at the lower 
end of the distribution in those years. At the same time the number of 
municipalities adopting an activation strategy doubled from 27 in 2005 to 54 in 





The past 15 years Dutch reforms in the legislation and administration of welfare 
and social assistance benefits shifted competence and financial responsibility from 
the national government to the local level of municipalities. As far as social 
assistance is concerned, these reforms culminated in the Work and Social 
Assistance Act (WSA) in 2004. Although municipalities do not have the authority to 
change the actual benefit level, they can develop their own local or regional 
policies, like cooperation, preventing unemployment, reintegration measures, 
gatekeeper-roles and so on. The gradual budgeting of the financial means for 
social assistance from 2001 to 2004, culminating in budgeting 100 percent of the 
costs of social assistance and reintegration to municipalities should give them 
enough incentives to act efficiently. So, the research question is whether Dutch 
municipalities have become more efficient in managing the costs of social 
assistance dependency.  
 
Three conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First the overall level of 
efficiency has improved. DEA shows a clear break in cost efficiency in 2004. Hence 
the WSA did improve municipal cost efficiency of social assistance. After 2004 the 
improvement slowly seems to leak away. The outcome of the DEA was very robust 
for other inputs used in the analysis.  
 
Second, SFA shows that municipal policy strategies do matter in improving cost 
efficiency of social assistance. We found that in the period 2005-2007 particularly 
a strategy of activating social assistance benefit recipients improved efficiency. 
Other strategies notably control and combinations of different strategies have had 
a lowering effect on cost efficiency. The changes in the distribution of efficiency in 
the period 2005-2007 can be explained by the changing policy mix that 
municipalities pursue during that period.   
 
Third the fact that some policy strategies contribute to increasing cost efficiency 
while others do not, is related to economic and regional circumstances. In periods 
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of strong job growth with a lot of open vacancies, many social assistance 
recipients move relatively easy into employment. In these circumstances control is 
not as effective as in less favorable periods when recipients put less effort in job 
search with the argument that no jobs are available. Activation on the other hand 
seems to give the right push to enter the labour market.  
 
To conclude, the overall efficiency is already very high in The Netherlands with a 
value around 95 percent. Hence, there is influence of municipal policy, as we have 
seen, but this effect is small. After all, about 95 percent of the social assistance 
expenditures in the period 2005-2007 are determined by the inputs, i.e., factors 
that are not directly at the municipality’s discretion. This confirms our research of 
the total policy effects on the in- and outflow of social assistance (Broersma et al, 
2011). Because of that, the margins at which efficiency improvement could take 
place are very small.     
 
NOTES 
                                                 
i Over time the number of municipalities has decreased due to mergers of small 
municipalities. To solve this problem municipalities were regrouped into the 443 
municipalities of 2007.   
ii For the period of 2004-2007 all expenditures are available at municipal level. For 2001-
2003 municipalities working together in a joint social service with others (i.e. an Inter-
Municipal Social Service, IMS) only information is available at that IMS-level. In those cases 
we have redistributed the information at municipal levels based on each municipal share of 
households in the total of the IMS.   
iii After 2004, municipal social assistance budgets comprise two parts: (i) an income part 
providing income support for the social assistance recipient and (ii) a work part providing 
(re-)integration (i.e. activation) support in order to stimulate acquiring skills and/or job 
search in order to increase the chance to (re-)enter the labour market. Before 2004 this 
distinction was not made and there was only one budget, corresponding to the income part. 
The dependent variable in our analysis refers only to the expenditures of the income part, 
because only for this part the municipality bears the financial risk. This is not the case with 
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the work part. Municipalities are stimulated to spend this money, because otherwise the 
money has to be paid back to the central government.  
iv This so-called objective distribution -model (‘objectieve verdeelmodel’) is gradually 
implemented and first been applied to the municipalities with over 60.000 inhabitants: in 
2004 the total amount of budget that was objectively divided lies at 40 percent, in 2006 the 
full budget was objectively divided. For the smaller municipalities (in 2004: less than 40.000 
inhabitants and from 2006 less than 30.000 inhabitants) the budgets were based on a a so-
called historical division model (‘historisch verdeelmodel’). For the in between group 
(40.000-60.000 inhabitants) a mixture is chosen between an objective and a historical 
dividing model.     
v This subsidy stems from the work part of the municipal social assistance budgets. 
vi Of course this implies that each indicator is scaled to make it comparable across 
municipalities. Wajong- and WSW-inflow are scaled with the total municipal population 
between 15-64 years of age. Fraud cases are related to social assistance recipients. 
Subsidised employment and other, non-subsidised, activation courses are also scaled with 
the social assistance recipients. Annual growth of establishment is in percentages and 
Economic Affairs outlays are relative to the entire population. IMS is already a dummy 
variable. 
vii We apply the Malmqvist index to account for the possible changes in the frontier itself as a 
result of the reform. 
viii The model specification in (1) represents the variables of the simplified model. We adopt a 
modelling strategy of moving from general to specific. The general models contains 
additional variables that could validly be deleted from our model. The estimation results of 
this general model are available upon request. Cross-section (i.e. municipal) fixed effects 
were not considered because than we lose too many degrees of freedom. Instead we include 
some characteristics of the municipalities like the part of the country (Nuts 1 region) where it 
is located and the size class of the municipality. 
ix Four size classes are distinguished: (i) more than 100.000 inhabitants, (ii) 50.000-100.000 
inhabitants, (iii) 20.000-50.000 inhabitants and (iv) less than 20.000 inhabitants. 
x We do acknowledge the fact that endogeneity between municipal policy strategies and 
social assistance expenses is important. However, we feel this is less of an issue here for 
number of reasons. First, in essence a municipality is free to determine what policy strategy 
it wishes to follow. Of course this may be influenced by the local circumstances or the 
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budgets they receive and these may be determined by local circumstances. Nevertheless, it 
remains at the municipality council’s discretion what policy strategies it will use and the 
political preferences may differ for municipalities with comparable local labour markets. 
Second, the statistical method used, in this case the SFA, is already a two-step approach 
where first the total variation in social assistance expenditures is explained by conditional 
and exogenous factors. On top of that, the remaining variance is explained by introducing 
the policy strategies. Third, the strategies are measured not by using the actual share of the 
underlying indicators, but by determination of whether a municipality lies above or below the 
national average of each of these indicators. 
xi Including municipal fixed effect dummies would boil down to adding 443 dummy variables 
to the model which implies a degrees of freedom problem. Instead we have added regional 
dummies and municipality size class dummies to pick up possible municipality fixed effects. 
xii Our model specification is drawn from Battese and Coelli (1995). In general terms, this 
may be expressed as yi,t = xi,tβ + (vi,t+ui,t) , where yi,t is the production of the i-th 
municipality in year t, xi,t represents the vector of input quantities of municipality i and β is 
vector of unknown parameters. The vi,t’s are random variables, that are iid, following a 
N(0,σv
2) distribution and they are independent of ui,t, which are non-negative random 
variables, which are assumed to account for technical inefficiency in production and are 
assumed to be independently estimated as truncations at zero of the N(mi,t,σu
2) , where 
mi,t=zi,tδ, where zi,t is a vector of variables that affects the efficiency of the municipal 
strategies and δ is a vector of parameters. The parameterisation of Batttese and Corra 




2 and γ= σu
2/(σu
2 +σv
2). The estimated 
values of σ2 and γ are also reported in table 3. The significance of any form of a stochastic 
frontier can be tested by the significance of the parameter γ. If the null hypothesis that γ 
equals zero cannot be rejected, this would indicate that σu
2=0 and so ui,t can be removed 
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Data appendix – Model variables 
 
 
Name Short description Source 
Expenditures social 
assistance 2004-2007 
Total of expenditures on social assistance to persons 
PER CAPITA? < 65 years of age. all municipalities  
Ministry of Social Affairs 
Expenditures social 
assistance 2001-2003 
25 percent expenditures on social assistance to 
persons < 65 years of age. all municipalities  
Ministry of Social Affairs 
   
Single-parent 
households 
Share of single parent households in total number of 
households 
Statistics Netherlands 
Minorities Share of minorities of non-Western descent in total 
population 
Statistics Netherlands 
Low incomes Share of households with income at the lowest 4 
deciles of the national income distribution 
Statistics Netherlands 
House value Total house value as share of total housing stock Statistics Netherlands 
Low educated Share population between 15-64 with a low 




Share of persons between 15-64 with a UI benefit Statistics Netherlands 
VU-ratio Ratio of vacancies and unemployed labour force in 
the corop-region (NUTS3) the municipality is in 
Statistics Netherlands 
Employment function Ratio of jobs and the population between 15-64 Statistics Netherlands 
Address density Number of addresses  per km2 Statistics Netherlands 
   
Fraud cases Share of fraud cases in average number of persons 
on social assistance 
Divosa and Statistics 
Netherlands 
Inflow Wajong Ratio of inflow in Wajong arrangement and 
population between 15-64 (at start of period) 
Statistics Netherlands 
Inflow WSW Ratio of inflow in WSW and population between 15-
64 (at start of period) 
Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Statistics 
Netherlands 
Reintegration courses Ratio of reintegration courses and population 




Ratio of subsidised reintegration courses and 
population between 15-64 
Statistics Netherlands 
   
   
   
   
   








FIGURE 1: Average municipal efficiency of social assistance 
















FIGURE 2: Average municipal efficiency of social assistance 


















FIGURE 3: Distributions of municipal efficiency (Y-axis) for 2001,  





FIGURE 4: Distributions of municipal efficiency (Y-axis) for 2005- 











TABLE 1: Four municipal policy strategies with respect to social 
Assistance, 2005-2007 
Municipal strategy Short description  Indicators 
Control (C1) Threat; emphasis on fraud detection and - Wajong-inflow* 
 research whether recipients are not  - WSW-inflow** 
 eligible for other social arrangements - Fraud cases 
Activate (A) Emphasis on participation by entering - Subsidized employment 
 into subsidized jobs or other courses - Non-subsidised  courses 
Employment (E) Emphasis on job creation by stimulus of 
new firms or by high municipal   
- Growth rate of  
  establishments 
 economic affairs outlays - Expenditures on  
  economic affairs 
Coordination (C2) Municipalities that have a joint social  
service with other municipalities 
 
* Wajong refers to the disability arrangement for young persons with no employment history 
** WSW refers to employment through social work provisions for disabled persons 
*** IMS stands for Inter-Municipal Social service and is a dummy variable of 1 when a 






TABLE 2: Options of policy strategies and combinations 
No. Strategies Municipalities 
in 2005-2007 
No. Strategies Municipalities 
in 2005-2007 
1 None 711 10 A+C2 38 
2 Control (C1) 69 11 E+C2 17 
3 Activate (A) 119 12 C1+A+E 7 
4 Employment (E) 69 13 C1-+A+C2 9 
5 Coordination (C2) 201 14 C1+E+C2 2 
6 C1+A 28 15 A+E+C2 5 
7 C1+E 22 16 C1+A+E+C2 0 
8 C1+C2 16 17 All 2 combinations 137 






TABLE 3: Estimation results of social assistance cost frontier 
model, 2005-2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cost model     
Including period fixed effects Yes No No No 
Constant 9.019*** 9.099*** 9.138*** 9.135*** 
Ln (HH_low income) 0.713*** 0.721*** 0.723*** 0.723
*** 
Ln (HH_single parent) 0.590*** 0.607*** 0.605*** 0.605*** 
Ln (POP_minority) 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.153
*** 
Ln (POP_unempl. insurance) 0.189*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 0.172
*** 
Ln (POP_low edu.) -0.120*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.127
*** 
Ln (Vacancy/Unemployment) -0.192*** -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.171*** 
Ln (Jobs) -0.223*** -0.227*** -0.223*** -0.223*** 
Ln (Addresses/km2) 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 
NORTH 0.177*** 0.187*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 
WEST 0.163*** -0.168*** -0.175*** -0.175*** 
SIZE >100k -0.376*** -0.382*** -0.370*** -0.370
*** 
SIZE 50-100k -0.190*** -0.191*** -0.181*** -0.184
*** 
SIZE 20-50k -0.211*** -0.211*** -0.207*** -0.207
*** 
Fixed effects:       Dummy 2006 0.029    
Dummy 2007 0.035    
    
 
Inefficiency model    
 
No specific strategy 0.010 0.001 0.021 0.022 
C1 0.104* 0.110** 0.094* 0.094* 
A -0.212* -0.274*** -0.298*** -0.316
*** 
E -0.072 0.022 -0.038 -0.029
 
C2 0.032 0.029 0.028 0.026
 
C1+A 0.110 0.122*   
C1+E 0.169** 0.180**   
C1+C2 0.093 0.113   
A+E 0.037 0.050   
A+C2 -0.067 0.018   
E+C2 -0.258 -0.089   
C1+A+E 0.117 0.133   
C1+A+C2 0.219** 0.238**   
C1+E+C2 0.146 0.174   
A+E+C2 0.109 0.120   
All combinations of 2 strategies   0.153**  
All combinations of 3 strategies   0.060  
All possible combinations    0.073
* 
     
σ2  0.057** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
γ 0.028 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
     
Log-likelihood 294.7 551.1 44.44 42.53 
Number of observations 1329 1329 1329 1329 
Number of cross-sections 443 443 443 443 
Number of time periods 3 3 3 3 
Seven large outlying values have been removed from the sample. 
* significance at 10 percent 
** significance at 5 percent 






TABLE 4: Efficiency scores by type of policy strategy, 2005-2007 
Strategy mean s.d. Max - min Strategy mean s.d. Max - min 
None 0.963 0.003 0.970-0.956 A+C2 0.915 0.005 0.924-0.903 
Control (C1) 0.877 0.005 0.896-0.869 E+C2 0.916 0.006 0.925-0.902 
Activate (A) 0.997 0.002 1.000-0.996 C1+A+E 0.811 0.005 0.815-0.803 
Employment (E) 0.978 0.001 0.981-0.976 C1+A+C2 0.808 0.004 0.815-0.803 
Coordination (C2) 0.944 0.004 0.957-0.930 C1+E+C2 0.810 0.007 0.815-0.805 
C1+A 0.913 0.004 0.921-0.904 A+E+C2 0.811 0.005 0.817-0.804 
C1+E 0.912 0.004 0.918-0.905 All 2 combinations 0.914 0.005 0.925-0.902 
C1+C2 0.913 0.004 0.919-0906 All 3 combinations 0.810 0.005 0.817-0.803 
A+E 0.915 0.004 0.923-0.907 All combinations 0.899 0.037 0.925-0.803 
Note: s.d. stands for standard deviation, as a measure of spread of efficiency, the range 
provides the maximum and minimum efficiencies, i.e. municipalities with highest and lowest 
efficiency value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
